BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DESPAIR:

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S INITIATIVE
ON THE
HORN OF AFRICA

Report of the President's Representative

June 1994
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report to the President</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background on the Horn of Africa</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Relief Challenges</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Relief to Recovery to Development</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Donor Coordination</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment I: Map of the Greater Horn of Africa</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment II: Estimated &quot;At Risk&quot; Population</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Annexes

- Annex 1: Members of the Presidential Delegation                        | 22   |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Strife, drought, and chronic food shortages have the potential to create in the Greater Horn of Africa a human crisis of unthinkable proportions. Current estimates indicate that over 20 million people are "at risk". This report details efforts undertaken by the U.S. Government to assess and mitigate the impact of this series of natural and man-made disasters.

The U.S. Government is currently tracking famine conditions in the Horn through the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Famine Early Warning System (FEWS). The FEWS satellite imagery capability, combined with USAID's on-the-ground field presence, provides the U.S. Government with a unique capacity to assess the vulnerability of the "at risk" population.

Drought conditions threaten virtually all the countries of the Greater Horn of Africa: Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda. While the bloodshed in Rwanda commands the headlines, civil conflict also continues in Somalia, Sudan and even in Kenya, long regarded as a center of stability in East Africa. Refugees streaming into Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda threaten these nations as well.

In response to the existing and impending crises in the Greater Horn of Africa the President of the United States sent a delegation led by USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood to discuss appropriate short, medium and long-term responses with affected countries and key donors and to call international attention to the situation. Included in the delegation were Representative Tony Hall, Chairman of the Congressional Hunger Caucus; Congressional staff; representatives of the Department of State and the National Security Council; leaders of major U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs); and members of the press.

The immediate relief needs facing the region are the result of poor 1993/94 growing seasons and civil unrest. The next harvest in Horn countries is expected to have little impact on short-term (4 to 6 months) food availability. Food security over the medium-term (6 months to one year) will greatly depend on whether there is sufficient rainfall in the region.

Food supplies now in the pipeline appear to be sufficient to meet urgent needs over the next few months, but USAID anticipates serious food shortages by late summer. Current projections indicate a need for over 2 million metric tons of food aid, of which

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1 "At risk" refers to vulnerable populations in need of external assistance to avoid severe hunger, starvation, disease, and/or displacement. The estimated number of people "at risk" will fluctuate as security and climatic conditions change.
a total of 1.6 million metric tons has already been pledged by the U.S. and other donors.

Assuming all pledges are met in a timely fashion, there will be a shortfall of 400,000 metric tons based on current projections. Civil unrest in Rwanda, Sudan and Somalia, as well as localized drought conditions, particularly in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and northern Kenya, could further increase the "at risk" population and emergency food needs.

However, even if more food is made available, the ability to deliver and distribute that food aid may be severely hampered by erratic shipping schedules, poorly maintained ports, and dilapidated road and rail systems. Non-food assistance is also required throughout the region. Health care, medicine, clean water, sanitation, and child immunization programs are an essential complement to food aid.

Meeting urgent humanitarian needs must be a priority, but the time has clearly come to galvanize the international donor community to address the broader causes of disaster. Failure to address the long-term root causes of crisis will perpetuate the cycle of despair afflicting the Horn and ultimately prove more costly to donors.

The long-term causes of food insecurity demand a strategic focus on sustainable development in the region to help governments increase agricultural yields, decrease population growth, and promote stable democratic institutions. Given the high degree of economic and political interdependence in this distinct region -- as well as common climatic and agricultural challenges -- the U.S. and other donors should work with affected countries in formulating a regional development strategy to build long term food security.

In the medium-term, assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of African states devastated by war and famine will be essential if the Horn countries are to make the transition from crisis to development. Special attention must be given to the creation of governing institutions that are democratic and thus capable of managing societal conflict.

Since the heightened magnitude of this emergency became apparent in March, 1994, the U.S. has taken several actions:

- Through reprogramming and commitment of available funding, the U.S. Government has already committed and programmed additional FY 1994 resources totalling $143 million and projects adding an additional $71 million. These amounts are in addition to previous FY 1994 expenditures totalling $366 million.

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2 If donors provide the 1.6 metric tons that have been pledged, there will still be a shortfall of 400,000 metric tons for the 1994 calendar year. Projected food needs, current as of June 14, 1994, are based on actual crop surveys conducted by USAID, the World Food Programme, and the Food and Agriculture Organization and assume average rainfall during the current season.
million.

- USAID has authorized early programming of up to 100,000 metric tons of FY 1995 food resources for emergency programs in the Greater Horn region.

- USAID has accelerated its scheduled food aid shipments in anticipation of additional needs by late summer.

- An extensive emergency logistical infrastructure survey covering the Greater Horn countries has been prepared by USAID and disseminated to major relief organizations and donors.

Since the designation of the Presidential mission to the Horn of Africa on May 25, 1994, several significant actions have already been taken to address the immediate crisis in the Horn. Specifically:

- The Japanese government has committed an additional $13 million to international organizations to be targeted on Rwanda and Sudan.

- The European Union has agreed to enter into regular consultations with the U.S. Government on the Horn. A USAID team is departing for Brussels on June 21.

- The Government of South Africa has expressed an interest in providing some form of assistance to the Horn.

This report recommends a plan of action for meeting the relief, recovery and development needs in the Horn. Specifically:

- The U.S. should share widely its assessments of emergency food and non-food needs in the Horn.

- All donors should be called upon to share accurate data on shipments of food and non-food items to meet the region's needs and to coordinate arrival dates to avoid overtaxing the ports.

- A donor working group should be formed to develop jointly with Greater Horn governments and regional organizations a comprehensive multi-year plan to address the short, medium and long term challenges of relief, recovery and development.

- The United States, other donors and international organizations need to agree upon an equitable burden-sharing arrangement for relief-related efforts, including port rehabilitation, leasing of aircraft, and other urgently needed logistics requirements.
To address potential infrastructure bottlenecks, planning should be undertaken to establish international donor food reserves/storage sites at one or more locations in the Horn.

As a last resort, the U.S. will consider using the Emergency Wheat Reserve.³

The donor group should develop a plan to assist the region's nations during the recovery phase. This should include demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and their families, reintegration planning for displaced populations and refugees, removal of land mines, assistance for vulnerable populations, and assistance to restore the institutions of democratic governance.

In Horn countries currently recovering from war or famine, donor priority should be given to strengthening local capacity to prevent, mitigate and manage disasters.

Donors should look to existing regional organizations and other technical agencies to help develop and apply strategies to improve food security. United Nations' agencies should coordinate action under a strengthened U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

The first, and most immediate, challenge for the U.S. and the international community is to prevent the current emergency from escalating into a full-blown crisis. To deter future crises, a regional strategy is needed to simultaneously address the relief, recovery and development needs. By helping affected countries recover from disaster and by building a foundation of sustainable development, the world community can help to break the cycle of despair afflicting the Greater Horn of Africa region.

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³The Food Security Wheat Reserve Act of 1980 directs the President to establish a reserve stock of wheat of up to 4 million metric tons for use in providing emergency assistance to developing countries, of which up to 300,000 metric tons can be released without regard to the U.S. domestic supply situation. Wheat can only be released by the President and only when adequate quantities of wheat are not available under P.L. 480.
I. INTRODUCTION

At the request of the President of the United States, a delegation composed of U.S. Government officials visited the Greater Horn of Africa between May 26 and June 4, 1994. The delegation was led by the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (USAID), J. Brian Atwood, both in his capacity as the U.S. Government's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance and as the President's personal representative.

Among those joining the delegation were Representative Tony Hall, Chairman of the Congressional Hunger Caucus, Congressional staff from the House Appropriations and Senate Agriculture Committees, representatives from the State Department and the National Security Council, leaders of major U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and members of the press. A complete list of those participating in the Presidential delegation can be found at Annex 1.

The purpose of the delegation's trip was to assess current conditions in the Greater Horn of Africa, to examine U.S. Government (U.S.) and other programs designed to address factors that contribute to famine and civil unrest, to share information, and to promote a constructive exchange of ideas designed to enhance cooperation within the region. The delegation met with the presidents and other key leaders in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Kenya. It also met with many others working to save human life, including the U.S. Ambassadors to Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and the heads of our missions in Kenya and Somalia; the Commander of UNAMIR; U.S. Government staff; and representatives of international PVOs and indigenous NGOs. Led by Congressman Tony Hall, part of the delegation visited the Benaco refugee camp in Tanzania.

The delegation also traveled to Rome, Geneva and Brussels in order to build greater support and awareness among other donors and international organizations concerning the magnitude of the problem, to demonstrate the commitment of the U.S. Government to a successful resolution of the current emergency, and to stress the need for enhanced donor support and coordination. In Europe, the delegation held meetings with the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the World Food Program, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the U.N. Commission for Refugees, the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs, and the European Union. The delegation's itinerary can be found at Annex 2.

The delegation confirmed that the current emergency has affected more than 20 million people. While a major effort will be required to avert famine and tragedy, the delegation believes the world community has a unique opportunity to mitigate human suffering. The delegation is convinced that the cycle of despair that has afflicted the Greater Horn of Africa will recur unless new efforts are made to address the root causes of the region's problems in the medium to longer-term.
II. BACKGROUND: THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA

Even in the best of times, the Greater Horn is one of the most politically, ethnically, and climactically unstable regions of the world. It includes some of the world's most ancient civilizations as well as its newest state, Eritrea. The Greater Horn is home to some of the poorest and the most densely populated nations in Africa, and to some of the continent's most vigorous economies. Its people are governed by aging, traditional, leaders, as well as by some of the youngest, most highly educated, and dynamic new leaders in Africa. The Greater Horn is home to three major wars and two countries newly emerged from divisive conflict. It is plagued by locusts and drought cycles which, in combination with rapid population growth and poor agricultural productivity, condemn the region to chronic food deficits. In short, the Greater Horn of Africa is one of the poorest and most conflict-ridden trouble spots in the world. (A map of the Horn of Africa is included at Attachment I.)

The Greater Horn of Africa was a region of major super power competition during the Cold War. A long and bloody war was waged between Eritrea and Ethiopia, a shorter war was fought between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden, and deadly civil conflicts were fought (Ethiopia and Uganda) and continue to be fought (Sudan and Somalia). While superpower competition took precedence, little attention was paid to addressing the problems of maldevelopment, population growth, and environmental degradation -- all of which have exacerbated the recurring food security crisis. Compounding the problem are weak governmental systems in the region, few of which are based on democratic practices that would enable them to manage societal conflict peacefully.

Economic and political realities tend to divide the Greater Horn in two: the northern tier (Djibouti, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia) and the southern tier (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania). One could argue that the differences among the nations of the Greater Horn are so great that there is no reason to consider them a region at all. But shared geography and ecology are important from a development perspective. The Great Rift Valley cuts across the region, creating areas of similar high potential for farming, lakes for fishing, and comparable areas of incredible beauty for tourism. In most of the countries, semi-arid lowlands and tropical forest zones flank the agriculturally productive highlands, creating habitats for a variety of wild game and domesticated livestock, and providing adequate resources for farming by an expanding population -- if appropriate crop varieties and good management practices are used.
While the nations of the Greater Horn are dissimilar in many ways, they share a number of challenges in common. Of these, the most pressing are political instability and chronic food insecurity. The failure to address these challenges has caused immense human suffering. Over the last decade, between two to three million lives have been lost in the Greater Horn. In addition, the U.S. alone has provided billions of dollars in emergency food and humanitarian aid to the region. In some countries, past USAID development investments have been largely lost. Currently, out of over 170 million people in the Greater Horn, USAID estimates that more than twenty million are in need of some type of assistance, with a much larger number suffering from chronic food insecurity.

There is a growing recognition of and consensus surrounding the steps that need to be taken to solve the problems afflicting the Greater Horn, both among African countries and international donors. This provides an opportunity for a renewed effort to address those problems. In particular, the delegation was encouraged by the efforts of some African leaders to help resolve conflicts in the region. In 1992, for example, Ethiopia convened a regional summit on humanitarian issues that brought together government officials, opposition forces, and local NGOs to discuss the right of civilians to assistance in times of war, among other issues.

The problems of economic and social development would be difficult enough to address given the relative poverty of the affected countries, the limits on donor assistance, the difficulty of introducing economic reform, and the resource drain created by large military establishments. They are further exacerbated by the lack of trust between governments, and absent, weak, or ineffective country and/or regional organizations for addressing common challenges.

Providing relief and longer term recovery and development is made all the more difficult by conflict situations in the Greater Horn. Security for donor operations and access to populations in areas of conflict inhibit relief deliveries and donors' ability to reach all of those in need.

The problems are further compounded by a lack of agreement, commitment and coordination regarding an overall strategy for the region among donors and international agencies, including the World Bank. In addition, donors have only limited experience in working as partners with indigenous and regional organizations.

The delegation found that there is a growing recognition among donors that their development investments are being overwhelmed by humanitarian crises, and that a different approach is needed if donors are going to play an effective role in the region. The current Greater Horn emergency presents a range of opportunities for better integrating the mix of short and longer-term programs. It also presents a challenge to use limited donor resources more effectively to address the fundamental problems facing the region.
III. IMMEDIATE RELIEF CHALLENGES

As of June 5, 1994, an estimated 20.6 million people were in need of external help in the Greater Horn of Africa due to conflict, drought, and growing structural food deficits. (See Attachment II on the following page). More than one million are totally dependent upon emergency assistance for their survival. The number affected increased by more than 4 million during the first four months of the year.

The next harvest in Horn countries is expected to have little impact on short-term (4 to 6 months) food availability. Food security over the medium-term (6 months to one year) will greatly depend on whether there is sufficient rainfall in the region. Current estimates of need are based upon a rapidly changing situation.

- In Rwanda and Burundi, the situation has worsened considerably as a result of the mass killings that have taken place following the death of the presidents of those nations on April 6, 1994. The situation has also worsened in Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia due to below normal rainfall. A continuing military offensive in southern Sudan has generated increasing numbers of displaced persons and refugees, further compounding the vulnerability and numbers of the "at risk" population.

- In Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, the situation has improved somewhat as the major rains began, easing fears that below normal rains earlier in the year heralded a major drought. However, Tanzania is now facing a major crisis with the arrival of more than 300,000 Rwandan refugees in the country. In addition, USAID has received reports that 100,000 people in the northeast corner of Uganda are experiencing serious famine conditions.

- In Somalia, the number of displaced persons has declined since the beginning of the year, and the food aid pipeline is full. However, the security situation remains unstable, and there is a continuing need to assist a large number of resettled people.

The amount of emergency food needed for the region is calculated at nearly two million metric tons (MT) -- and at an estimated cost of just under one billion dollars. The U.S. is poised to provide 888,000 MT of food valued at approximately $373 million to the ten countries of the Greater Horn during this calendar year. As best as can be determined, the rest of the international donor community has pledged to provide a total of 670,000 MT. Thus, the U.S. will be providing about 60 percent of all donated food if all current pledges are met.

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4 It is estimated that 2 million metric tons of food will be needed in the region for the 1994 calendar year. This estimate, current as of June 14, 1994, is based on actual crop surveys conducted by USAID, the World Food Programme, and the Food and Agriculture Organization and assumes average rainfall during the current season.
ATTACHMENT II:
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF "AT RISK" PEOPLE IN THE GREATER HORN
AS OF JUNE 5, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>DROUGHT</th>
<th>DISPLACED</th>
<th>REFUGEES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,320,000</td>
<td>356,000</td>
<td>1,676,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>6,700,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>6,850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>1,370,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>670,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>2,330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>410,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>620,000</td>
<td>4,920,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>412,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>476,000</td>
<td>888,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>440,500</td>
<td>540,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11,592,000</td>
<td>6,570,000</td>
<td>2,442,500</td>
<td>20,604,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Data Source:** Drought figures come from USAID/AFR/REDSO and the FEWS project. Displaced figures come from USAID Missions. Refugee figures come from State/RP. Figures for Burundi and Rwanda should be viewed as best estimates given the highly fluid situation in both countries. Some estimates, for example, put the number of displaced within Rwanda at 2.2 million, with the number rising daily.
However, much of the food pledged by the U.S. and other donors has yet to arrive. As a result, a considerable shortfall in needed food remains. USAID has recently taken decisive action to speed up its food shipments; several hundred thousand metric tons of U.S. commodities will be arriving much sooner than originally expected. By contrast, European donors indicated that they may not meet their stated pledges. As a last resort, it may be necessary for the U.S. to consider using its Emergency Wheat Reserve.

During the course of its trip to the region, the delegation learned that logistical problems were hampering the relief effort. The major regional ports have varying capacities to handle the on-going and expected influx of food and other relief commodities. Mombasa, the largest and busiest port in the region, is currently badly congested. More than 800,000 MT of commercial cargo and relief supplies are currently piled up in warehouses. The problem stems from insufficient transport to move goods inland and lack of a mechanism for coordinating the scheduling and delivery of food aid shipments to the region.

Three ports with a combined annual offtake capacity of 2,200,000 MT -- Asab, Djibouti and Massawa -- are also experiencing a variety of problems. Massawa was badly damaged during the struggle for Eritrean independence. Asab is currently operating well below capacity, but there is concern that its aging equipment could collapse under the expected strain as food shipments pick up later in the year. Djibouti should be an important asset, but high pilferage and poor storage argue against its being used heavily unless rapid throughput is assured.

The eight major railroad systems in the region are in various stages of disrepair. The overall condition of the region's major roads is generally adequate to handle the current movement of relief supplies inland. However, secondary roads are not in as good shape, which means that distribution to remote areas is proving difficult in many countries. While the number of trucks in the region is generally sufficient, many are old and not in good condition. Eritrea has a critical shortage of storage space. On a more positive note, the Greater Horn has a well-developed air transport system. That constitutes a major asset in our efforts to prevent a crisis.

The delegation observed that U.S. PVOs and indigenous NGOs are playing a strong and effective role in addressing the current emergency by assisting the Horn's most vulnerable groups and communities. Their community-based, people-centered programs are critical to both relief and development assistance efforts. Like the U.S. and other donors, they are affected by many of the same problems. These include poor roads, inefficient government policies, and natural and man-made disasters. They asked that we and our donor partners use our influence with governments in the region to facilitate their operations and eliminate bottlenecks. They urged donors to work with governments to establish policies that would allow them to work more effectively and directly with grassroots groups. Because they work at the grassroots, moreover, their
operations are especially vulnerable to conflict and instability.

In sum, the immediate challenge for the U.S. and the world community is to prevent, to the extent possible, the current emergency from escalating into a full-blown crisis. The priorities in this effort are clear:

- To bring an end to the slaughter in Rwanda and assist the survivors, and to prevent a similar outbreak of violence in neighboring Burundi.

- To continue pressing for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sudan while providing aid to the victims of this tragic war.

- To monitor the 1994 agricultural season in the Horn to determine populations at risk and emergency food aid needs, both of which are in a state of flux.

- To encourage other donors to fulfill their food aid pledges to the Horn as quickly as possible. The U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs should do likewise and should provide regular updates through a standardized data base on needs, the status of pledges, and actual deliveries to the region.

- Wherever possible, to encourage donors who provide emergency assistance in cash to use it to purchase food from within Africa in order to insure timeliness of delivery and to create incentives for African farmers.

- To address serious logistical problems within the region that are impeding the delivery of urgently needed food and other relief in conjunction with other donors and the affected countries.

- To provide health services, potable water, sanitation, and education for the millions displaced by civil conflict in the region in order to forestall environmental and humanitarian catastrophes.

- To actively facilitate the work of U.S. PVOs and indigenous NGOs.
IV. FROM RELIEF TO RECOVERY TO DEVELOPMENT

Throughout the trip, the delegation was challenged to rethink its views on famine in the region and to move away from the traditional response to food emergencies. The evolution of the current crisis in the Horn reaches back generations. During the Cold War, the Horn of Africa became militarized as a result of alliances between both the U.S. and the Soviet Union and a range of non-democratic regimes. It remains one of the most heavily armed regions of Africa today. With militarization came a rapid decline in social services and under-investment in agriculture which contributed to the gradual and steady erosion of the productive capacity of small farmers. Coupled with rapid population growth, which is in itself a consequence of poverty, declining productive capacity has increased vulnerability. It was striking to note that, in all of the countries of the Greater Horn, families can move from being self-sufficient to being totally dependent simply because of the failure of one rainy season. This fragility results from the failure to address the long-term stresses that have afflicted the Greater Horn.

As has been noted, it is clear that what is now a collection of localized emergencies within the Greater Horn could easily be transformed into a widespread regional crisis of alarming proportions. The situation requires an immediate response designed to address current food, health, water, and shelter needs, and to prepare for or forestall the major disaster that might arise. At the same time, the delegation concluded that the international community cannot afford to continue addressing emergencies without simultaneously addressing their root causes. Failing to do so would only result in greater costs, expanded vulnerability, and, thus, recurring disasters in the region.

The relief-recovery-development continuum is a concept that informed the delegation's thinking and that was also clearly reflected in the views of official and non-governmental leaders in the region, as well as other donors. This strategic framework requires the international community to shift from a traditional approach which has been largely reactive (i.e. responding to recurrent disasters as a relief problem only) to one which is more proactive (i.e. looking at the allocation of each relief and development dollar in terms of its long-term impact and effectiveness in addressing root causes of the crises). Essentially, employing the concept of the relief-recovery-development continuum requires linking relief and development interventions by investing relief dollars with a view to developmental goals while at the same time ensuring that development assistance addresses the long-term vulnerabilities that provoke disasters.

If such a strategy is not developed and implemented, the food security problems will cease to be cyclical and could become a permanent feature of the human landscape of the region.
A. MEDIUM TERM: RECOVERY

During the course of its visit to the Horn, the delegation concluded that the region faces several political challenges which are contributing to the current crisis and impeding long-term development efforts:

- Failed states that lack functioning governments, and the disorder and insecurity that results;
- Lack of trust among governments and differing perspectives on regional problems;
- The active involvement of some states in the destabilization of others;
- States paralyzed by tribal, clan, religious, and/or civil conflict;
- States experiencing difficult political transitions that have serious human rights problems and only limited experience with democracy;
- States governed by regimes that lack transparency, accountability and a commitment to addressing the real needs of their people;
- Challenges arising from the demobilization of former combatants; and
- Growing numbers of long-term refugee and displaced populations due to natural or manmade disasters, and the absence or failure of efforts to reintegrate these populations.

The U.S. and other nations face major constraints in addressing these challenges. No nation acting alone can effectively influence all of the countries in the region, particularly those like Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda that are most seriously affected by conflict. There is also some reluctance among donors to tackle difficult political issues. The problem is exacerbated by absent, weak or ineffective national, regional, and international mechanisms for addressing these political challenges.

The need to invest in rehabilitation and recovery was made clear to the delegation during its visit. Refugees, internally displaced or demobilized ex-combatants make up a significant proportion of the people in the Greater Horn considered to be "at risk". In many ways, these individuals are at greater risk than any of their counterparts for the simple reason that they lack land, which is the primary asset of the majority of people living in the region. Their reintegration requires not only provision of land or repatriation assistance but also with providing them with the means to produce food. In some cases, the numbers are so large (i.e. Eritreans in Sudan, Somalis in Ethiopia, and Sudanese in Ethiopia) and the duration of the dislocation so long, that reintegration requires reconstructing villages.
The urgency of responding to the needs of dislocated people was evident in Eritrea. Three years following the end of a thirty year war and one year after independence, the Government of Eritrea faces enormous challenges. Over 20 percent of the population has been dislocated and requires assistance in order to successfully reintegrate into the society and economy. Failure to reintegrate these people, who include refugees returning from neighboring countries, demobilized soldiers and their families, war victims and orphans, among others, would risk their permanent dependence on Government assistance, possible internal instability and decreased production. The delegation believes that USAID should increase development assistance funding for Eritrea and provide the necessary staff to effectively utilize the increased assistance.

To make the transition from relief to development, the delegation was convinced of the need to use relief assistance as creatively as possible, for example by supporting food-for-work and monetization programs, and the purchasing of local food where possible -- thus supporting and stimulating local and intra-regional trade. It was also clear that it is necessary to engage in activities that restore productive capacity as quickly as possible.

In the case of Ethiopia, the delegation was told by President Meles that every African nation runs the risk of becoming a failed state if people lose hope. In that country, the Government has adopted, and USAID is supporting, a policy which dictates that there will be no free food distribution except in those cases where people are unable to work. Alternatively, people having inadequate food supplies are provided with food in exchange for their participation in public and community work programs. The benefits of this foresighted policy are clear: although in need of basic assistance, people remain productive and can maintain a sense of dignity and hope. This is not to suggest that food-for-work is a panacea. There are other equally worthy programs that deserve continued support, such as maternal/child health activities and school feeding programs.

The need to encourage free markets and to stimulate greater intra-regional trade was illustrated by the delegation's visit to Kenya. At the urging of USAID, the government of Kenya removed key trade barriers with neighboring Uganda. In turn, that led Kenyan traders to purchase 400,000 metric tons of Ugandan maize in order to respond to the large food deficit in Kenya. These commercial purchases will save donors from having to provide substantial food assistance to Kenya. At the same time, they have provided an incentive to Ugandan farmers to increase production.

If the international community is to respond effectively to the Horn crisis, it must design its interventions to address productive capacity. That means providing assistance that will keep farmers active as long and as extensively as possible. It also means

5 "Monetization" refers to selling P.L. 480 food commodities in host country markets to generate local currency.
rehabilitating those producers who have lost their ability to produce, as well as reintegrating returning refugees and demobilized soldiers.

In the final analysis, however, both field sites and discussions with people throughout the region made clear the need for long-term strategies. It is within a long-term framework that short and medium-term strategies must be designed and evaluated. By adopting a long-term strategy and then fashioning relief and rehabilitation activities to reflect long-term goals and objectives, the international community can move away from pouring billions of dollars into the region with little or no return and toward investing its assistance to the benefit of both donors and the people of the region.

The delegation makes the following recommendations with respect to recovery and rehabilitation efforts in the Horn:

- Donors should actively support conflict resolution efforts and urge other donors to do the same. Because democratic institutions are likely to take years to become effective, it is essential in the short-term that donors support African-based and African-led conflict prevention and mediation mechanisms. This will at least help avoid tragedies, such as in Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi, which are costly in human and financial terms. It will also help maintain a stable environment within which democratic institutions can be nurtured, and broad-based sustainable development can be promoted.

- Donors should support civic associations and NGOs that serve to empower the general populace and enable them to engage their governments.

- Over the medium to longer-term, donors should strengthen fledgling democratic processes and institutions, and help support greater respect for basic human rights.

- Donors should develop recovery programs designed to build on relief efforts and to facilitate longer term development, including demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, repatriation and reintegration of refugees, reintegration of displaced populations, and de-mining.

B. LONG-TERM: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Addressing the recovery and rehabilitation needs will be necessary if the region is to have any hope of prospering. At the same time, the region faces key developmental challenges, including the following:

- Chronic food insecurity of a short or long-term nature due to inappropriate policies and production technologies, environmental degradation, recurring
drought and pestilence, and poor infrastructure;

- Population growth at rates in excess of food production increases;

- The use of food as a weapon by some governments and political movements in the region, and the resulting need to depoliticize food;

- Recurring natural and manmade disasters that drain the resources of states and donors and limit the impact and effectiveness of development interventions;

- High child mortality and illiteracy rates, and high incidence of disease, including HIV/AIDS; diarrheal and vaccine preventable diseases, such as measles; and malaria;

- Poor governance typified by large military expenditures that drain government resources from the productive and social sectors; and

- Highly vulnerable and growing populations that lack income-generating opportunities and that have only a limited ability to accommodate disruptions in the agricultural cycle.

At its core, a Horn strategy must involve regional actors and donors working in concert to fashion a comprehensive approach to development in the region -- an approach that runs the spectrum from war to peace, famine to prosperity, and from poverty and conflict to justice and stability.

The goal of this strategy should be to reduce chronic food insecurity in the Horn by decreasing variability in agricultural production, increasing household access to food, liberalizing markets in order to encourage greater intra-regional trade, harnessing and managing the region's water resources, and laying the groundwork for sustainable development in the region. To achieve this goal, the delegation believes that it will be necessary to address both immediate short-term issues, as well as longer-term structural food deficits, in a coherent and coordinated fashion.

The delegation also concluded that the scope of the strategy should encompass countries in the region as well as traditional and new donors to the region. In essence, the delegation believes that chronic food insecurity will be better addressed if the nations of the Horn come together to exchange information and ideas and coordinate their efforts to address food insecurity to the maximum extent feasible.

That will not happen quickly or easily, however. During the course of its visit, the delegation learned that there are a variety of technical organizations in the region that are addressing the issue of food security. However, those organizations have proven successful largely because they have avoided becoming involved in difficult political
issues. Similarly, there are a variety of organizations within the region that have attempted to address political issues more directly. However, these organizations have proven largely ineffective because of the lack of trust that currently exists between the nations of the Greater Horn.

As a result, the delegation concluded that the U.S. Government should encourage and support efforts to promote greater networking in the region between and among technical organizations that are addressing the food security issue, as well as among U.S. PVOs and indigenous NGOs. The U.S. should also continue efforts to strengthen those regional institutions that are attempting to address the larger political issues that have impeded efforts to address chronic food insecurity in the Horn. Finally, the delegation believes that U.S. should take the lead in initiating a series of consultations within the region to build support for efforts aimed at addressing chronic food insecurity.

The delegation makes the following recommendations with respect to long-term development needs in the Horn:

- To encourage Greater Horn Governments' policy focus and their concentration of indigenous resources on the root causes of food emergencies: rampant population growth, ecological degradation, poor governance, and failed economic policies.

- Development efforts should be focused on strengthening local capacity to prevent, mitigate, and manage disasters. A major strategic objective should be to enhance food security through increased agricultural productivity, production and food availability, enhanced water resource management, and greater intra-regional trade.

- Donors, in partnership with host country governments, should develop a long-term sustainable development strategy for the Greater Horn within the relief/recovery/development continuum framework. Existing regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), and other regional technical agencies should be enlisted to assist in developing and applying strategies to improve food security.
V. ENHANCED DONOR COORDINATION

It is apparent that donors need to design their interventions within a broader framework. In particular, donors should coordinate their resources to meet both short term emergency needs as well as longer term sustainable development requirements. With regard to short-term issues, the focus for such a regional framework should be disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness through enhanced early warning, coordinated emergency relief, building local capacity, and strengthening local disaster management capabilities. With respect to longer-term issues, the focus should be on increasing agricultural production, reducing population growth and environmental degradation, improving the policy environment (including marketing and input delivery systems), and facilitating greater networking between and among organizations that are addressing food security issues, as well as between U.S. PVOs and African NGOs.

In short, it is clear that effectively meeting the long-term challenges facing the Horn of Africa will require precise and consistent coordination involving both the countries of the region and donors. Achieving this level of coordination will require extensive consultation within the region as well as a concerted effort between and among donors and international organizations.

There are several regional and continental mechanisms that focus on the Horn of Africa. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) is one regional body with a mandate to coordinate a range of disaster-related activities. Recently, it has begun acting as the focal point for conflict resolution activities in Sudan. But IGADD has experienced only limited success to date and does not include all of the nations of the Greater Horn. Other potentially relevant mechanisms include the OAU, which is headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The OAU has recently developed its own conflict-resolution mechanism, which deserves donor support. Working with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the ECA’s humanitarian assistance task force has developed a strategy for agricultural production and food security for the Horn.

While the capacities and requirements of U.S. PVOs and African NGOs vary widely throughout the region, they generally recognize that broader coordination and collaboration must evolve if their efforts are to yield greater efficiencies and more profound impacts. Since 1991, the Horn has seen the emergence of a number of indigenous NGO bodies focussing on policy issues. These include the Inter-Africa Group based in Ethiopia, the Regional Centre for Human Rights and Development based in Eritrea, and the NGO Networking Service based in Ethiopia, which covers the entire region.

Donors should encourage and support the emergence of regional networks that link indigenous NGOs together. At the same time, African NGOs need support and technical assistance to become more effective in their work with local communities. There was a general acceptance by both American PVOs and African NGOs that more
could be done in the area of capacity building. One way this could be achieved is by placing a renewed emphasis on establishing mentoring relationships and partnerships between American PVOs and indigenous NGOs. Equally important, the American groups see an important role for themselves in education directed at the American public concerning the nature, causes, and dimensions of the challenges facing the Horn.

As noted, no donor body currently exists to deal specifically with the Horn of Africa although the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), bilateral Consultative Group meetings, and other mechanisms occasionally provide fora for addressing issues of regional concern. In 1993, donors formed the Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB), a coordinating mechanism that has proven useful in terms of sharing information and conveying donor unity to the warring factions in Somalia. However, it has had only limited effect in terms of strategically harmonizing donor activities on the ground in Somalia.

It is clear that efforts to encourage donors and the nations of the Horn to operate within a shared regional framework will not succeed without their cooperation and support. It is also clear that the regional framework that is needed will not emerge without strong leadership. In short, for this strategy to succeed, it must be a collaborative effort. A new organization is not necessarily the answer to this problem; however, a new commitment to multilateral action and a regionally-oriented strategic approach are essential.

Finally, the delegation would stress once again that its recommendations are not intended to substitute for U.S.' and other donors' existing bilateral programs in the region. Those programs are and should remain the building blocks for this regional initiative.

The delegation recommends that the U.S. exercise leadership to energize and stimulate among donor countries in exploring and addressing the challenges facing the Horn. Specifically:

- The U.S. should share widely its assessments of needs in the Horn based on its Famine Early Warning System and its country-by-country analysis.

- A donor support group should be formed to develop a comprehensive multi-year plan to address the short, medium, and long term challenges of relief, recovery, and development in the Horn. Governments in the region should participate with this informal group, either through existing regional entities or on a bilateral basis.

- Donors should be called upon to share accurate data on shipments of food to meet the region's need and to coordinate arrival dates to avoid overtaxing the ports and storage facilities.
The United States, other donors, and international organizations should collaborate in developing a plan for meeting immediate regional infrastructure needs and will also support longer-term development needs.

Donors should work together to develop an equitable burden-sharing arrangement for relief-related efforts, including port rehabilitation, leasing of aircraft, and other urgently needed logistics requirements.

To address potential infrastructure bottlenecks, planning should be undertaken to establish international donor food reserves/storage sites at one or more locations in the Horn.

United Nations' agencies should coordinate action under a strengthened U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

VI. CONCLUSION

The crisis in the Horn affords the donor community and the governments of the region an opportunity to restructure the traditional ways of responding to man-made and natural disasters. Historically, relief, recovery, and development have been compartmentalized exercises.

By addressing the root causes of the current food insecurity within an integrated relief/recovery/development framework, relief efforts can become a flexible and creative instrument for addressing the very problems which have created this complex emergency in the first place.

Absent a shared vision, both the nations of the Horn and international donors will continue to find themselves reacting to emergencies. A more pro-active stance is needed among donors, international agencies, and the nations of the Greater Horn.

One of the striking characteristics of the region is that despite the human pain and suffering, people have an amazingly resilient spirit and a determination to build a better future for themselves and their children. This spirit, combined with a new breed of leadership in the region and an emerging consensus among donors on a new strategy to deal with the crisis, creates the potential for an opportunity-based approach to problem solving.

Efforts to prevent crises require leadership. That leadership and strong commitment was reflected by the President's directive to undertake this important initiative.
ANNEX 1
MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION
TO THE HORN OF AFRICA

J. Brian Atwood, Administrator, Agency for International Development
Congressman Tony Hall, Chairman, Congressional Hunger Caucus
Ambassador David Shinn, Director of Office of East African Affairs, Department of State
COL Mac DeShazer, Director of African Affairs, NSC
Terry Peel, Staff Director, House Foreign Operations Subcommittee
John Morrill, Press Secretary for Congressman Hall
Arthur Dewey, Executive Director, Congressional Hunger Center
Kate Howard, Legislative Assistant, Senate Agriculture Committee
Nan Borton, Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, AID
Gary Bombardier, Deputy Assistant Administrator, AID
Jennifer Windsor, Special Assistant, AID
Jay Byrne, Chief, Press Division, AID
Bob Boyer, Deputy Assistant Administrator, AID
Jackie Stein, Personal Assistant, AID
Carrie Goux, Scheduler, AID
Jennifer Douglas, Senior Policy Adviser on Humanitarian Assistance, AID
Bruce Bennett, Special Assistant, AID
Phil Johnston, President, CARE
Bob DeVecchi, President, International Rescue Committee
Ken Hackett, Executive Director, Catholic Relief Services

Tim Zimmerman, *U.S. News & World Report*

Alvin Bessent, *Newsday*

Patricia Griffiths, Block Communications (*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* and *Toledo Blade*)

Chris Hanson, *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*

Paul Brown, *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*

Reed Kramer, *Africa Newswire*

Doug Stephan, *Talk America Network*

Ellen Ratner, *Talk America Network*
ANNEX 2
ITINERARY OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION TO THE HORN

Thursday, May 26, 1994 Washington, D.C.
7:00 pm Administrator Atwood, Staff and Delegates depart Andrews AFB

Friday, May 27, 1994 Asmara, Eritrea
7:55 pm Arrive Asmara, Eritrea

Saturday, May 28, 1994 Asmara, Eritrea - Tessenei, Eritrea - Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
7:15 am Briefing on Humanitarian Issues
9:30 am Site Visit and Tour of Refugee Sites in Tessenei, Eritrea
9:30 am Site visit to Nefisit, Eritrea - Clinic for war veterans and families/vocational/technical retraining center for wounded Eritrean veterans of the civil war
3:30 pm The Administrator and delegation meets with President Isaias and Cabinet Staff followed by a press conference
5:30 pm Reception with PVOs, government official, and donors
Delegate meeting with Organization of African Unity, Dr. Edward Clinton
9:10 pm Depart En route Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Sunday, May 29, 1994 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
9:30 am Delegation Briefing by Fred Fischer, REDSO Director
11:30 am Delegate meeting with United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Chief of the Technical Cooperation Office
1:30 pm Site Visits in Nazareth, Ethiopia
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7:00 pm</td>
<td>Reception with Senior Transitional Government of Ethiopia Ministers</td>
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<tr>
<td>8:00 am</td>
<td>Breakfast Roundtable with delegation local NGO Partners on Relief to Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00 am</td>
<td>Delegation Meeting with Key Economic Ministers of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 am</td>
<td>The Administrator and delegation meets with President Meles</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:30 pm</td>
<td>Lunch hosted by Ministry for External Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:30 pm</td>
<td>The Administrator and Delegation meets with Ato Simon Mechaile, Head of Relief and Rehabilitation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:45 pm</td>
<td>Site Visit at CARE Food For Work site</td>
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<tr>
<td>5:30 pm</td>
<td>Press Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:00 pm</td>
<td>The Administrator and delegation depart for Nairobi</td>
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**Tuesday, May 31 1994, Nairobi, Kenya**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:00 am</td>
<td>Briefing by country teams - Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia</td>
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<td>8:00 am</td>
<td>Congressman Tony Hall led part of delegation on all-day visit to Rwanda refugee camp in Benaco, Tanzania</td>
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<td>10:00 am</td>
<td>The Administrator and delegation meet with President Moi</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00 am</td>
<td>PVO and Delegate Roundtable Discussion on Food Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 am</td>
<td>Delegation Site Visit to USAID family planning project</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 am</td>
<td>Delegation Meeting with International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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Representative, Jean-Daniel Toux
Issue: Recent trip to Rwanda

11:30 am
The Administrator meets with General Daullaire
Issue: Rwanda

12:30 pm
Lunch hosted by DCM Michael Southwick for major humanitarian assistance organizations

4:30 pm
Press Availability

6:00 pm
The Administrator meets with Human Rights Activists Peter Anyang and Grace Githu

Wednesday, June 1, 1994, Nairobi, Kenya - Rome, Italy - Geneva, Switzerland

7:00 am
The Administrator and Delegation depart Kenya

1:35 pm
The Administrator and Delegation arrive Rome, Italy

3:15 pm
The Administrator and Delegation meet with Cardinal Etchegarry, Head of Pontifical Council for Peace and Justice

4:30 pm
Delegation meeting with the International Fund for Agricultural Development, World Food Program, Food and Agriculture Organization

8:15 pm
Depart for Geneva

Thursday, June 2, 1994, Geneva, Switzerland - Brussels, Belgium

9:00 am
Delegation Meeting with Ambassador Spiegel US Mission

10:00 am
The Administrator and Delegation meet with Sadako Ogato, Commissioner, UN High Commission on Refugees

11:15 am
The Administrator and Delegation meet with Cornelio Sommaruga, President, International Committee of Red Cross

12:30 pm
Luncheon hosted by Ambassador Speigel with Ambassadors from key donor countries
2:30 pm  The Administrator and Delegation meet with Acting Secretary General Stephen Davey, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

3:30 pm  The Administrator and Delegation meet with Charles Lamuniere, Deputy Director, UN Department Humanitarian Affairs

4:30 pm  Press availability
        Palais des Nations

6:00 pm  Depart for Brussels

Friday, June 3, Brussels, Belgium - Washington, D.C.

9:00 am  The Administrator and Delegation meet with
        Ambassador Eizenstat, US Mission

10:15 am The Administrator and Delegation meet with EU Development
        Commissioner Manuel Marin

11:15 am Press Availability

12:30 pm Lunch hosted by Ambassador Eizenstat with key representatives of
        the EU

2:30 pm  The Administrator and Delegation meet with ECHO Director
        Santiago Gomez-Reino

3:30 pm  The Administrator and Delegation meet with Director General for
        Africa, Peter Pooley

4:00 pm  The Administrator and Delegation meet with EU Commissioner for
        External Political Relations, Hans Van Den Broek

8:30 pm  Depart for Washington, D.C.